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Abstract. In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model where the popu-
lation expands with the arrival of a man and a woman. Individuals in this population
are matched, before and after the expansion, according to a version of the deferred
acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) where men propose and women reject
or (tentatively or permanently) accept. Using computer simulations of this model,
we study how the percentage of matches disrupted (undisrupted) with the expansion
of the population is affected when the initial size of the population and the size of
correlation in the preferences of individuals change.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that for every two-sided (heterosexual) population in which indi-
viduals’ preferences satisfy some mild assumptions there always exists a one-to-one
(monogamic) matching that is stable. Under such a matching no pair of individu-
als would prefer each other to their mates and no individual would prefer staying
single to his/her match. This celebrated result is due to Gale and Shapley (1962)
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who provide the proof by showing that a dynamic procedure —called the deferred
acceptance (DA) algorithm— always produces, after some finite iterations, a sta-
ble matching. According to this algorithm, individuals in one side of the population
propose for matching and individuals in the other side reject or (tentatively or perma-
nently) accept these proposals. Because of its simplicity and computational power,
this algorithm has been very popular and useful —since it was proposed (and in
some markets even before that)— to solve many theoretical and practical matching
problems (e.g. Roth, 1984, 2002, 2008; Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˜lu,
Pathak, and Roth, 2005; and Pathak and So¨nmez, 2008).
In this paper, we aim to investigate —with the help of computer simulations—
how the stable matching generated by the DA algorithm is affected when the popu-
lation expands with the arrival of a man and a woman. To measure the investigated
effect, we count the number of matches disrupted (undisrupted) after the expansion
of the population, and in more detail, the number of individuals who change/retain
their marital status and the number of individuals who change/retain their partners.
Then, we explore how all these numbers change with the size of population and the
size of correlation in the preferences of individuals over potential partners.
While our research question and our findings are novel to the best of our knowl-
edge, the destabilizing effects caused by a change in the matching population are
already known in the matching literature since the works of Blum et al. (1997) and
Cantala (2004), dealing with one-to-one markets and many-to-one markets respec-
tively. In this literature, the closest work to ours is due Gabszewicz et al (2008),
who show by example that entry to the matching population can heavily destabilize
one-to-one marriages and suggest a new stability concept, called k-external stability,
to account for the disruptive effects of a change in the matching population. In more
detail, Gabszewicz et al (2008) say that the matching population (the marriage mar-
ket) is k-externally stable if at any stable matching at least k of the matches are not
disrupted whenever the matching population expands with the entry of a man and a
woman. Using this definition, they show that a matching population with n men and
n women would become 0-externally stable (the worst possible case) if all individuals
had common (homogenous) preferences over potential mates whereas the degree of
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external stability would be n− 2 (the best possible case) if all individuals had peak
load preferences, i.e., a structure of preferences requiring that on a common ranking
of individuals the further distant a potential mate is from the rank of an individual,
the least preferred it is. We should note that in our study we do not consider all
possible stable matchings associated with the matching population; we focus on the
stable matching generated by the DA algorithm, only. Hence, when we expand the
matching population, we measure the extent of the survival of the matches under
this particular matching only, instead of calculating the degree of external stability
of the whole matching population. In addition, unlike in Gabszewicz et al (2008),
we consider heterogenous preferences, using a setup we borrow from Saglam (2019a,
2019b). This setup allows us to vary, in our simulations, the degree of correlation in
the preferences from zero to one and to measure the possible effects of this variation
on the percentage of disrupted/undisrupted matches.1 Moreover, we measure these
effects by varying the initial size of the matching population, as well.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and
Section 3 presents our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a population involving a finite set of men M and a finite set of women W ,
where each individual can be matched to another individual only if they are from
opposite sexes. Let N = M ∪W denote this population. Individual i ∈ N derives
the utility Ui(j) when he/she is matched with individual j, and derives the utility
Ui(i) when he/she is unmatched to any individual (and remains single). Given any
X, Y ∈ {M,W} with X 6= Y , any i ∈ X, and any j, k ∈ Y ∪{i}, we say that i prefers
j to k if Ui(j) > Ui(k). We assume that each individual in the population knows all
1Using this setup, Saglam (2019b) extends the Todd and Miller’s (1999) results in mutual sequen-
tial mate search obtained under homogenous preferences to the case of heterogenous preferences
whereas Saglam (2019a) studies how the heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences and the intensity
of their learning about their own aspirations (before a matching takes place) can affect the like-
lihood of marriage and divorce as well as the balancedness and the speed of matching under the
stable outcome of the DA algorithm.
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relevant utilities for himself/herself before a matching takes place, and these utilities
do not change during the matching process.
A matching is a one-to-one function µ : N → N such that for each m ∈ M and
w ∈ W , µ(w) = m if and only if µ(w) = m. In addition, µ(m) /∈ W if and only
if µ(m) = m, and µ(w) /∈ M if and only if µ(w) = w. Individuals m and w are
matched to each other if µ(m) = w, and individual i is single if µ(i) = i.
A matching µ is said to be acceptable for individual i if Ui(µ(i)) ≥ Ui(i); i.e., the
utility of individual i from the match µ(i) is not below the utility from being single.
Also, given any matching µ, a man m and a woman w are together called a blocking
pair for µ if µ(m) 6= w and Ui(j) > Ui(µ(i)) for i, j ∈ {m,w} with i 6= j; i.e., m
and w are not matched under µ and they prefer each other to their matches at µ.
Given these definitions, a matching µ is said to be stable if µ is acceptable for each
individual and there exists no blocking pair for µ.
A celebrated result in matching theory, due to Gale and Shapley (1962), shows
that there exists a stable matching for every matching population provided that in-
dividuals’ preferences satisfy completeness and transitivity.2 Moreover, under these
assumptions, a stable matching can always be obtained as the outcome of a pro-
cedure, called the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm, which has two versions de-
pending upon the roles of men and women. In one of these algorithms, men propose
to women and women give rejections or (tentative or permanent) acceptances, while
in the other algorithm proposals are given by women and rejections/acceptances by
men. The matching outcomes of these two algorithms, even though they are both
stable, have different welfare implications. Gale and Shapley (1962) shows that if all
individuals have strict preferences, the DA algorithm, when men (women) propose,
always produces the men-optimal (women-optimal) stable matching; i.e. a stable
matching which is preferred by all men (women) to any other stable matching.
2Given two alternatives x and y, an individual is said to weakly prefer x to y if he/she strictly
prefers x to y or is indifferent between them. The preference ordering of this individual over the
set of possible alternatives satisfies completeness if for any two alternatives in this set it is true
that he/she weakly prefers one of them to the other. Also, his/her preference ordering satisfies
transitivity if for any three alternatives x, y, z it is true that he/she weakly prefers x to z whenever
he/she weakly prefers x to y and weakly prefers y to z.
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We will denote by DA-MP (DA-WP) the deferred acceptance with men proposing
(women proposing). Below, we describe the DA-MP algorithm with k ≥ 1 steps.
Initially, all individuals are single in this algorithm. (Interchanging the roles of men
and women, one can simply obtain the DA-WP algorithm from below.)
Step k ≥ 1: Every man who is in step 1, or who was rejected in step k−1 when k
is at least 2, proposes to his most preferred woman in his updated list of acceptable
women (if any). A man makes no proposal if his list is empty. Each woman holds the
most preferred acceptable proposal she has received until now and rejects all other
proposals. Then, each man rejected in this step deletes the woman who rejected him
from his list of acceptable women. (Above, if any individual is indifferent between any
two potential mates, he/she is allowed to break the tie arbitrarily.) The algorithm
terminates when no further proposal is made by any man, and at this step each
woman is matched to the man (if any) whose proposal she is holding.
Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that the above algorithm must always yield, after
finite steps, a stable matching.
3 Results
Below, we study through computer simulations how the external stability of the
matching outcome of the DA-MP algorithm is affected by a change in the size of
heterogeneity in the preferences of individuals when the initial size of the matching
population is also varied. We conduct all simulations using GAUSS Software Ver-
sion 3.2.34 (Aptech Systems, 1998). (The program code of the simulations and the
resulting data are available upon request.)
We assume that the number of men and the number of women in the initial
population are the same and denoted by n; and we vary in our simulations the number
n between the integers 2 and 100. For each n, we denote the corresponding population
by Nn. We consider the addition of a man and a women to this population, and call
the expanded population by N en+1. We denote the set of men and women in the
initial and extended populations by Mn,Wn and M
e
n+1,W
e
n+1.
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We model the preferences of individuals in the population N en+1 (which contains
Nn by construction) using the preference structure in Saglam (2018, 2019). Formally,
we assume that for any n, any X, Y ∈ {M en+1,W en+1} with X 6= Y , any i ∈ X, and
any j ∈ Y , the match utility Ui(j) of individual i derived from individual j satisfies
Ui(j) = ω U
c(j) + (1− ω)Upi (j),
where U c(j) denotes the common part of the utility any individual in X can derive
from individual j, Upi (j) denotes the private part of the utility only individual i can
derive from individual j, and ω denotes a weight parameter that is, for simplicity,
assumed to be common for all individuals in X ∪ Y . In our simulations, the utilities
U c(j) and Upi (j) in the above expression are always randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution of values in [0, 100]. On the other hand, the weight parameter ω is
varied inside the set of values {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}. It is clear that the higher the value
of ω, the less heterogenous the preferences of individuals. In particular, ω = 0
and ω = 1 induce completely heterogenous (perfectly uncorrelated) and completely
homogenous (perfectly correlated) preferences, while ω = 1/3 and ω = 2/3 induce
partially heterogenous (imperfectly correlated) preferences.
Our simulation results are reported in the six panels of Figure 1. Panel (a) illus-
trates the percentage of matches disrupted with the expansion of the population by
the arrival of a man and a woman. Our results show that the higher the correlation
(the lower the heterogeneity) in the preferences of individuals, the lower the percent-
age of disrupted matches. Moreover, the size of the population, unless it is extremely
small, has no remarkable effect on the percentage of disrupted matches, irrespective
of the size of heterogeneity in the preferences. Here, the calculation of disrupted
matches include an individual if the marital status of this individual changes (from
single to married or from married to single) or if this individual is married with a
different partner before and after the expansion of the population. We report these
three types of disruptions separately in panels (b)-(d).
Panel (b) shows that as the population size becomes higher, the percentage of in-
dividuals who change —after the expansion of the population— their marital status
from married to single becomes smaller and smaller, always tending towards zero.
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The size of heterogeneity in the preferences has negligible effects on our results.
Nevertheless, we always obtain the lowest percentage values when the preferences
are homogenous. All these observations are also valid for panel (c), where we report
the percentage of individuals who change —after the expansion of the population—
their marital status from married to single. The only remarkable difference between
panels (b) and (c) is about the levels. We observe that when the population expands,
there are more individuals who change their marital status from single to married
(panel c) than from married to single (panel b), especially when the initial size of
the population is sufficiently small. In panel (d), we report the percentage of indi-
viduals who are married with different partners before and after the expansion of
the population. We should immediately see that this percentage is monotonically
decreasing in the size of correlation (ω), irrespective of the initial size of the pop-
ulation. However, the population size can have significantly large effects when it is
extremely small. In that case, we observe that the higher the size of the population,
the higher the percentage of married individuals who become divorced and marry
with another partner after the expansion of the population.
In the last two panels of Figure 1, we analyze undisrupted matches. In panel (e),
we illustrate the percentage of individuals who are married with the same partner
before and after the expansion of the population. We observe that this percentage is
much lower —irrespective of the population size— when the preferences of individuals
are perfectly correlated than when they are uncorrelated. However, a change in the
correlation parameter is found to be much more effective when it is smaller. The same
observation also holds for the population size. Irrespective of the level of correlation
in the preferences, the initial size of the population, when sufficiently small, has a
positive impact on the percentage of individuals who do not change their partners
after the expansion of the population. Finally, in panel (f) we report the percentage
of individuals who are single both before and after the expansion of the population.
We observe that this percentage is always increasing in the size of correlation in
the preferences, while it is generally decreasing in the population size unless the
preferences of individuals are very highly correlated.
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Figure 1. Various Effects of the Population Expansion on the Outcome of the DA
algorithm.
8
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how the stable matching outcome generated by the
DA algorithm is affected when the matching population expands with the arrival
of a man and a woman. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we have showed that the
size of correlation in the preferences of individuals has, in general, a negative effect
on the overall percentage of disrupted matches, irrespective of the initial size of the
population. While this negative effect is observed for both the set of individuals who
change their marital status (from married to single or from single to married) and
the set of married individuals who change their partners after the expansion of the
population, the magnitude of the effect is incomparably larger in the latter case. On
the other hand, the initial size of the population is found to have no remarkable effects
on the overall percentage of disrupted matches, unless it is extremely small. However,
this last result becomes no longer valid when we identify the type of disruption in
our simulations. We find that the percentage of individuals who change —after
the expansion of the population— their marital status is hyperbolically decreasing
with the population size, whereas the percentage of individuals who are married to a
different partner before and after the expansion of the population is mildly increasing
unless the size of correlation in the preferences is extremely high.
Our results on disrupted matches imply opposite effects on undisrupted matches.
That is, the population size should have no remarkable effect on the overall percent-
age of undisrupted matches, unless it is extremely small. In addition, the size of
correlation in the preferences should, in general, have a positive effect on the overall
percentage of undisrupted matches. We find that these overall effects can partially
hold when we consider, in isolation, the percentage of individuals who are married
with the same partner before and after the expansion of the population. In that case,
the size of correlation, when it is not too high, has a negative effect whereas the size
of population, when it is extremely small, can have a positive effect. On the other
hand, when we take into consideration the percentage of individuals who are single
both before and after the expansion of the population, the size of correlation in the
preferences has always a positive, and remarkably large, effect whereas the size of
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population has a negative effect (only) if the size of correlation is sufficiently small.
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